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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 
BROWNSVILLE DIVISION 
 
STATE OF TEXAS, ET AL.,   §    
  Plaintiffs,    §   
       § 
V.       §  CIVIL NO. B-14-254 
       §         
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL.,  § 
  Defendants.    § 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 
 
 On February 23, 2015, the Defendants, including the United States and various officials 
of the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) (hereinafter the “Government” or 
“Defendants”), filed an Emergency Expedited Motion to Stay this Court’s February 16, 2015 
Order of Temporary Injunction [Doc. No. 150] concerning the DAPA1 program (and the 2014 
amendments to the DACA2 program) established by the November 20, 2014 Memorandum 
issued by DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson (hereinafter the “2014 DHS Directive” or “Directive”).  
The Government supplemented its motion on March 12, 2015 [Doc. No. 195].  Just prior to filing 
its Motion to Stay, the Government filed a Notice of Appeal to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
[Doc. No. 149].  The Plaintiff States3 (hereinafter the “Plaintiffs” or “States”) responded to the 
Government’s Motion to Stay on March 3, 2015 [Doc. No. 175]. 
The States have also filed a Motion for Early Discovery [Doc. No. 183].  In their 
discovery motion, Plaintiffs complain that the Government misled them and the Court by making 
                                                            
1 “DAPA” is the acronym for Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents. 
 
2 “DACA” is the acronym for Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals. 
 
3 The Plaintiffs include: the State of Texas; State of Alabama; State of Arizona; State of Arkansas; State of Florida; 
State of Georgia; State of Idaho; State of Indiana; State of Kansas; State of Louisiana; State of Montana; State of 
Nebraska; State of Nevada; State of North Dakota; State of Ohio; State of Oklahoma; State of South Carolina; State 
of South Dakota; State of Tennessee; State of Utah; State of West Virginia; State of Wisconsin; Attorney General 
Bill Schuette, People of Michigan; Governor Phil Bryant, State of Mississippi; Governor Paul R. LePage, State of 
Maine; Governor Patrick L. McCrory, State of North Carolina; and Governor C. L. “Butch” Otter, State of Idaho. 
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certain representations concerning when and how parts of the 2014 DHS Directive would be 
implemented.  The Court finds that the Government’s multiple statements on this subject were 
indeed misleading, as detailed in the Order filed simultaneously with this Order.  It also finds 
that the remedial measure taken by counsel for the Government through the filing of an 
“advisory” on March 3, 2015, was neither prompt nor fully candid.  Despite this, a sanction as 
severe as striking the Government’s pleadings, while perhaps merited based upon the 
Government’s misconduct, would not at this juncture be in the interests of justice or in the best 
interest of this country.  The issues contested in this case are of national importance, and the 
outcome will affect millions of individuals.  The parties’ arguments should be decided on their 
relative merits according to the law, not clouded by outside allegations that may or may not bear 
on the ultimate issues in this lawsuit.  Consequently, while this Court may impose some other 
sanction in response to the misrepresentations made to the Court, it will not strike the 
Government’s pleadings.4  The Court now turns to the merits of the Government’s Motion to 
Stay―the focus of this Order. 
In its Motion, the Government has essentially asked this Court to reconsider its decision 
to issue a preliminary injunction.  The Court has reviewed the Government’s Motion and 
Supplemental Motion, as well as the States’ response.  The Court also held a hearing on March 
19, 2015, at which these issues were discussed.  Having considered the positions of all parties 
and the applicable law, this Court remains convinced that its original findings and rulings in the 
Order of Temporary Injunction and Memorandum Opinion and Order issued on February 16, 
                                                            
4 While it remains to be seen what substantive effect, if any, this conduct has had on this case, it has clearly delayed 
the Court from being able to rule on the merits of the Motion to Stay.  If it is later proven that the Government’s lack 
of candor substantively affected this Court’s ruling on the temporary injunction (or the current appeal thereof), or 
that it will somehow affect the eventual resolution of the merits of this case, or if the Government either directly or 
indirectly violates this Court’s injunction, the Court will revisit the propriety of striking the Government’s pleadings. 
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2015 (hereinafter referred to jointly as the “February Opinion”) were correct.  In fact, for many 
of the reasons stated below, the decisions reached previously by this Court have been reinforced. 
I. Standing 
 The Government reasserts its claim that the States do not have standing.  For the most 
part, it presents the same arguments that this Court has already considered and addressed at 
length.  Consequently, the Court will not repeat its analysis on those points.  Instead, it will 
concentrate on aspects that are either new or that were not necessarily emphasized during the 
prior hearing. 
Specifically, the Government argues that because this Court’s findings on standing 
focused on Texas’ injury, operation of the 2014 DHS Directive should not be enjoined as to 
other states, including the other Plaintiff States, because no specific findings were made as to 
their injuries. For the same reason, the Government also objects to the breadth of the 
injunction—an argument the Court will address below.5  
As confirmed by the Supreme Court’s opinion in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 
(2007), the Court need only find standing for one plaintiff in order for it to conclude that it has 
jurisdiction to hear the case.  In Massachusetts v. EPA, multiple states (including California, 
Connecticut, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, 
Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington) and other entities filed suit to compel action by the 
Environmental Protection Agency, alleging that the federal agency was failing to enforce the law 
and had “abdicated its responsibility under the Clean Air Act” to regulate certain emissions.  Id. 
                                                            
5 As an initial matter, the Court notes that, given the emergent nature of this temporary injunction, the Court, as well 
as counsel for both sides, operated on a short schedule—a timeframe in essence set by the Government based upon 
its projected dates for implementation of the 2014 DHS Directive. At the preliminary injunction stage of the 
proceedings, there is no requirement for each and every plaintiff to produce sufficient evidence of any injury 
allegedly caused by Defendants’ actions, as long as at least one plaintiff has standing.  See infra note 10.  All of the 
Plaintiffs may very well have been able to show standing individually based upon a direct damage or abdication 
claim if they had been given time to make such a presentation.  
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at 505.  The Government in that case objected to the plaintiffs’ standing to bring the suit, just as 
the Government has in the present case.  
The Supreme Court, noting its obligation to address standing before proceeding to the 
merits, stated in pertinent part: 
In response, EPA, supported by 10 intervening States and six trade associations, 
correctly argued that we may not address those two questions [dealing with the 
merits] unless at least one petitioner has standing to invoke our jurisdiction under 
Article III of the Constitution. 
 
Id. (emphasis added).  Ultimately, the Supreme Court found that it had jurisdiction by virtue of a 
single state, Massachusetts, just as this Court found that it has jurisdiction by virtue of a single 
state, Texas.  Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens concluded: 
Only one of the petitioners needs to have standing to permit us to consider the 
petition for review.  See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional 
Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 52, n.2, 126 S. Ct. 1297, 164 L. Ed. 2d 156 (2006). 
 
Id. at 518.   
Thus, the Government has already fought this battle once in the Supreme Court and lost.  
Following the dictates of the Supreme Court in Massachusetts, there is at least one plaintiff in 
this case that has established it will be directly damaged by the 2014 DHS Directive and that it 
has standing.  This Court therefore has jurisdiction to hear the case.  Consequently, the Court 
denies the Government’s requested relief based upon that ground. 
 Second, with regard to the February Opinion’s discussion of standing by virtue of 
abdication,6 recent actions taken by the Government confirm that it has abdicated enforcement of 
the applicable portions of the Immigration and Naturalization Act (“INA”).  During a “Town 
Hall” meeting on immigration, held after this Court granted the preliminary injunction, the 
                                                            
6 The Court notes that because it found Texas would suffer direct damages, abdication was not the only basis upon 
which standing was found. 
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President discussed the recent changes implemented at his direction.  In response to a question 
from an individual upset over a deportation action, the President said: 
THE PRESIDENT:    I would have to know the details of what exactly 
happened.  But what I can tell you is that until we pass a law through Congress, 
the executive actions that we’ve taken are not going to be permanent; they’re 
temporary. 
 
We are now implementing a new prioritization.  There are going to be some 
jurisdictions, and there may be individual ICE officials or Border Patrol who 
aren’t paying attention to our new directives.  But they’re going to be answerable 
to the head of the Department of Homeland Security, because he’s been very clear 
about what our priorities should be.  And I’ve been very clear about what our 
priorities should be. 
 
*     *     * 
 
MR. DIAZ-BALART [the moderator]:     But what are the consequences?  
Because how do you ensure that ICE agents or Border Patrol won’t be deporting 
people like this?  I mean, what are the consequences? 
 
THE PRESIDENT:     José, look, the bottom line is, is that if somebody is 
working for ICE and there is a policy and they don’t follow the policy, there are 
going to be consequences to it.  So I can’t speak to a specific problem.  What I 
can talk about is what’s true in the government, generally. 
 
In the U.S. military, when you get an order, you’re expected to follow it.  It 
doesn’t mean that everybody follows the order.  If they don’t, they’ve got a 
problem.  And the same is going to be true with respect to the policies that we’re 
putting forward. 
 
Press Release, Remarks by the President in Immigration Town Hall―Miami, FL, The White 
House Office of the Press Secretary (Feb. 25, 2015), available at 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/25/remarks-president-immigration-town-
hall-miami-fl (emphasis added).7 
 The President’s message, specifically to those law enforcement officials employed within 
the Executive Branch, and more generally to the nation, is clear.  First, immigration laws (i.e. the 
                                                            
7 Counsel for the Government assured the Court that it could trust and rely upon the President’s statements.  [Hr’g 
Tr. 22, Mar. 19, 2015]. 
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INA), which those officials are charged with enforcing, are not to be enforced when those laws 
conflict with the 2014 DHS Directive.  Second, the criteria set out in that Directive are 
mandatory.  Third, if DHS officials (or other Executive Branch officials) fail to follow the 
specified criteria, there will be consequences for this failure―just as there would be 
consequences if they were in the military and disobeyed an order from the Commander in Chief.  
In summary, the Chief Executive has ordered that the laws requiring removal of illegal 
immigrants that conflict with the 2014 DHS Directive are not to be enforced, and that anyone 
who attempts to do so will be punished. 
This is not merely ineffective enforcement.  This is total non-enforcement, applicable to 
millions of people.  If one limits the directive just to putative DAPA recipients, this is an order 
by the President to not enforce the law as to approximately 4.5 million people—the rough 
equivalent of the population of the State of Louisiana, and a population larger than the 
populations of 25 of the 50 states.8  In fact, thirteen of the 26 Plaintiff States have populations 
that are less than the number of illegal immigrants estimated to receive the benefits 
accompanying “legal presence” under the 2014 DHS Directive.9 
                                                            
8 U.S. Census Bureau, Population Distribution & Change:  2000 to 2010 (2010 Census Briefs) (issued March 2011), 
available at http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-01.pdf (hereinafter “U.S. Census Bureau”).  The 
State of Louisiana is the 25th most populous state, with a population of 4,492,076 according to the 2010 U.S. 
Census.  Id.  
  
9 Further, while DAPA applies to an estimated 4.3 to 5 million illegal immigrants, the White House has also 
announced that, “the way the change in the law works is that we’re reprioritizing how we enforce our immigration 
laws generally.  So not everybody qualifies for being able to sign up and register, but the change in priorities applies 
to everybody.”  Press Release, Remarks by the President on Immigration―Chicago, IL, The White House Office of 
the Press Secretary (Nov. 25, 2014) (emphasis added).  Therefore, according to the President, the law requiring 
removal is also not going to be enforced (subject to limited exceptions) against any of the remaining estimated 6‒7 
million illegal immigrants who may apply under the 2014 DHS Directive, but are rejected.  As such, the President’s 
order not to enforce the INA could potentially affect a total population greater than the populations of 43 states 
(depending on which population study one uses to estimate the illegal immigrant population and how many 
immigrants apply for DAPA).  See U.S. Census Bureau. 
 
Support for this conclusion is found not only in the President’s remarks, but also in the manner in which DACA has 
been implemented.  The evidence presented led this Court in its February Opinion to conclude that DAPA will be 
enforced like DACA.  Moreover, attorneys for both sides have recommended that the Court use the DACA 
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 The President’s statements have obvious significance to this case.  Both the Fifth Circuit 
and the United States Supreme Court have stated that a plaintiff, including a state, has standing 
to pursue an action when the Government is abdicating its statutory duties, and that such 
abdication is judicially reviewable.  See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 833 (1985) (citing 
Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc)); Texas v. United States, 106 
F.3d 661, 667 (5th Cir. 1997) (noting that a conscious decision to abdicate immigration 
enforcement responsibilities would be reviewable).10  The facts underlying this case indisputably 
represent abdication.  This Court so found.  The President’s recent statements serve as 
confirmation for that finding. 
II. Application Of The Administrative Procedure Act  
 The Government also asks this Court to review its ruling concerning the applicability of 
the Administrative Procedure Act (hereinafter the “APA”).  Here, too, the President’s 
explanation of the 2014 DHS Directive is important.  First, it corroborates the Court’s finding 
that the employees charged with implementing this new program are without discretion.  The 
criteria under DAPA (and the DACA amendments) pursuant to the Directive are fixed and are 
binding on DHS employees.  Those employees who attempt to exercise discretion by varying 
from the Directive and the criteria set forth therein will suffer consequences, according to the 
President. 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
experience as a guideline.  [See, e.g., P.I. Hr’g Tr. 90‒91, 107, Jan. 15, 2015; Doc. No. 38 at 30 (Def. Resp. Brief)].  
In fact, counsel for the Government specifically referred this Court to the DHS’ publication of “Frequently Asked 
[DACA] Questions” to evaluate how DAPA will be implemented.  [P.I. Hr’g Tr. 107].  That publication indicates 
that pursuant to DACA, even non-qualifying illegal immigrants are not deported.  See Frequently Asked Questions, 
Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals Process, Official Website of the Dept. of Homeland 
Security, http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/consideration-deferred-action-childhood-arrivals-process/frequently-
asked-questions#afterUSCISmakesadecision (last reviewed/updated Mar. 10, 2015).  Using this publication as an 
indication of how DAPA will work, as was suggested by counsel for the Government, one cannot avoid drawing the 
conclusion that those who are rejected for DAPA will likewise not be deported. 
 
10 This concept alone arguably establishes standing for all of the States, not just Texas.  The Court need not explore 
that argument though because, as stated above, only one State needs standing for the Court to hear the case. 
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 The President’s statement also confirms this Court’s finding that the 2014 DHS Directive 
is not a “general statement of policy,” or mere “general guidance” to DHS employees, but is, 
rather, a mandatory directive that is easily characterized as a substantive rule under the APA.  As 
this Court has noted, and all parties concede, a “legislative” or “substantive” rule is one that 
requires vetting under the process established by the APA.  The following are the hallmarks of a 
substantive rule―any one of which would alone be sufficient to make a rule substantive―as 
summarized from the pertinent case law: 
1. A rule that narrowly constricts the discretion of agency officials is a 
substantive rule (as opposed to a general statement of policy that does not 
establish a binding norm and “genuinely” leaves officials free to exercise 
discretion).11 
 If there were any doubts that the 2014 DHS Directive is correctly characterized as 
“substantive,” the President’s warning to DHS employees of adverse consequences for failing to 
follow the Directive should clearly extinguish those.  The criteria under the 2014 DHS Directive 
unquestionably “narrowly constrict[] the discretion of agency officials by largely determining the 
issue addressed.”  Shalala, 56 F.3d at 595 n.20.  Those with boots on the ground are bound to 
follow the Directive’s criteria, and the President takes it even further by positively stating that 
those who do not follow the Directive will suffer consequences.  Other than the Directive’s facial 
claim that it permits case-by-case determinations (which the Court has already found 
disingenuous and contrary to what was occurring in practice), the “challenged policy [does not] 
leave[] the agency free to exercise its discretion to follow or not follow that general policy in an 
individual case”; instead, “the policy so fills out the statutory scheme that upon application one 
need only determine whether a given case is within the rule’s criteria.”  Id. at 596; see also 
                                                            
11 See, e.g., Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Professionals & Patients for 
Customized Care v. Shalala, 56 F.3d 592, 595 n.20, 600‒01 (5th Cir. 1995). 
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Brown Express, Inc. v. United States, 607 F.2d 695, 700 (5th Cir. 1979) (“The label that the 
particular agency puts upon its given exercise of administrative power is not . . . conclusive; 
rather, it is what the agency does in fact.”) (citations omitted).  The Court previously found this 
factually, and the President’s statements reinforce both the Court’s factual findings and legal 
conclusions. 
2. A rule is substantive/legislative if it adopts a new position 
inconsistent with existing law or otherwise effects a substantive 
change in existing law or policy.12 
If there were any claim that the 2014 DHS Directive does not adopt a new position 
inconsistent with the INA, the President’s comments also lay that argument to rest.  Instead of 
removing individuals who are violating the INA, the new program rewards them with legal 
presence and a whole host of benefits.  Yet, while the law-breaker is rewarded, any officer or 
agent who attempts to enforce the law as enacted will be made to suffer the consequences.  This 
is a sea-change under anyone’s definition:  the law-breaker receives a myriad of benefits and the 
law enforcement officer suffers adverse ramifications.   
The 2014 DHS Directive is both contrary to existing immigration legislation and an 
unprecedented executive action by even the agency’s own account.  [See Doc. No. 38, Def. Ex. 2 
at 30 (the Executive’s Office of Legal Counsel conceded that the program was unprecedented in 
terms of size)].  The President said as much when he announced to the nation that he “took an 
action to change the law.”  Press Release, Remarks by the President on Immigration―Chicago, 




12 See Mendoza v. Perez, 754 F.3d 1002, 1021 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
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3. Agency actions that confer benefits not otherwise provided for 
in existing law are “legislative.”13 
 
This Court has previously described in detail the benefits, in addition to three years of 
renewable legal presence, that the DAPA program awards its recipients.  There is no need to 
repeat those here.  Nevertheless, the Court notes that in the weeks surrounding this Court’s 
February Opinion, the IRS Commissioner confirmed under oath that DAPA recipients would be 
eligible for tax benefits.  Recent Congressional testimony confirms that DAPA recipients would 
additionally be awarded Social Security benefits.14  To give removable immigrants these benefits 
is certainly a new policy, which, at the very least, should be afforded notice and comment under 
the APA.  See, e.g., Am. Mining Congress, 995 F.2d at 1112 (providing as one factor, which may 
alone make a rule substantive, “whether in the absence of the rule there would not be an adequate 
legislative basis for . . . agency action to confer benefits”).  The Government has acknowledged 
that its strategy with DAPA is to provide certain benefits as an incentive for individuals to apply 
for DAPA.  [Hr’g Tr. 30, Mar. 19, 2015].  It also confirmed, through counsel, that offering these 
incentives is not an act of prosecutorial discretion: “I think an incentive for this pro - - the reason 
why deferred action in the department’s judgment works in a way that’s different than the 
                                                            
13 See Scenic America, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Transp., ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2014 WL2803084, at *5 (D.D.C. June 20, 
2014); Am. Mining Congress v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1110, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1993).  
 
14 Again, awarding income tax credits to illegal immigrants is not only a tangible benefit, but it is also a substantive 
change in the law.  The Plaintiff States had argued that DAPA recipients would receive Social Security benefits as 
well as Social Security cards (and no one suggested that the States were incorrect).  However, prior to its February 
Opinion, this Court was not provided with cogent evidence supporting that assertion.  After the Court’s February 
Opinion, experts testified before Congress that DAPA recipients will receive both tax and Social Security benefits.  
See The Fiscal Costs of the President’s Executive Actions on Immigration, Hearing Before the H. Comm. on 
Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 113th Cong. (Mar. 17, 2015) (statements of Robert Rector, Senior Research Fellow, the 
Heritage Foundation; Eileen J. O’Connor, Esq., Partner, Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP, previous Assistant 
Attorney Gen., Tax Div. of DOJ; Steven A. Camarota, PhD, Director of Research, Center for Immigration Studies).  
One expert’s testimony included the opinion that the lifetime costs of Social Security and Medicare benefits to 
DAPA recipients are likely to exceed one trillion dollars.  See id. (statement of Robert Rector).  This Court does not 
have a record before it by which to quantify this benefit or analyze such testimony, but, if true, whether it is one 
dollar or a trillion dollars, it represents an award of a benefit heretofore contrary to law; thus, it triggers the need for 
APA compliance. 
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prosecutorial discretion is it does provide an incentive for people to come out and identify 
themselves.”  [Id. (emphasis added)].  
Any one of the above-discussed three traits of a substantive rule would independently 
subject the 2014 DHS Directive to the mandatory rulemaking procedures of the APA.  In this 
case, the Directive qualifies under all three. 
III. Breadth Of The Injunction 
The Government additionally argues that because this Court found standing as to Texas 
and omitted specific findings as to injuries suffered by other states, the injunction should only 
apply to Texas.15  This argument is contrary to both the dictates of the Constitution and the very 
arguments that the Government has recently made before other courts.  The Constitution 
provides in Article I, Section 8, that Congress shall have the power: 
To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization and uniform laws on the subject of 
Bankruptcies throughout the United States. 
 
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (emphasis added).  Obviously, the intent of the framers was to place 
in the bailiwick of Congress the power to establish immigration laws and the obligation to make 
such laws uniform. 
 The Government argued this very point to the United States Supreme Court in Arizona v. 
United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).  There, it alleged that Arizona’s laws affecting illegal 
immigrants should be preempted because they disrupted the “comprehensive” federal scheme.  
The Court sustained this view, writing:  
Federal law makes a single sovereign responsible for maintaining a 
comprehensive and unified system to keep track of aliens within the Nation’s 
borders.  If § 3 of the Arizona statute were valid, every State could give itself 
independent authority to prosecute federal registration violations, “diminish[ing] 
                                                            
15 The Government offers as support for this argument the claims presented by twelve other states and the District of 
Columbia who filed a brief as amici curiae suggesting that the 2014 DHS Directive could help their economies.  
While this assertion may be true, it does not affect the need for APA compliance. 
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the [Federal Government]’s control over enforcement” and “detract[ing] from the 
‘integrated scheme of regulation’ created by Congress.”  Wisconsin Dept. of 
Industry v. Gould Inc., 475 U.S. 282, 288–289, 106 S. Ct. 1057, 89 L. Ed. 2d 223 
(1986).  Even if a State may make violation of federal law a crime in some 
instances, it cannot do so in a field (like the field of alien registration) that has 
been occupied by federal law.  See California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 730–731, 
733, 69 S. Ct. 841, 93 L. Ed. 1005 (1949); see also In re Loney, 134 U.S. 372, 
375–376, 10 S. Ct. 584, 33 L. Ed. 949 (1890) (States may not impose their own 
punishment for perjury in federal courts). 
 
Id. at 2502 (emphasis added). 
Most recently, in its amicus curiae brief in Arizona Dream Act Coalition v. Brewer, 757 
F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2014), the Government emphasized the “comprehensive federal statutory 
scheme for regulation of immigration and naturalization” established by the INA.  [See United 
States’ Brief as Amicus Curiae in Opposition to Rehearing En Banc, Arizona Dream Act 
Coalition v. Brewer, 757 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2014), ECF No. 75.].  (This is the same statutory 
scheme that the DHS has ordered its employees not to enforce.)  Despite these past arguments, 
the Government now suggests for the first time here that this Court should apply one 
immigration scheme to Texas and a different one to the rest of the states.  This is tantamount to 
conceding that the Government’s arguments in 2012 to the Supreme Court in Arizona and in 
2014 to the Ninth Circuit in Brewer were frivolous.  Regardless, there is a lengthy history of 
precedent concerning the need for a uniform approach to immigration, and this Court sees no 
reason to depart from those cases. 
Further, if the Government violates the procedural dictates of the APA, that violation 
affects the entire nation, not just the one state that points out the violation.  The Court therefore 
denies the request to limit its injunction to apply only to Texas. 
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IV. The Preliminary Injunction Will Not Inflict Irreparable Harm On The Government 
The States have objected to the Government’s additional affidavits, which were filed 
after the issuance of the injunction.  Regardless, this Court, with one exception, finds that these 
affidavits add little to the substantive arguments previously made.  The exception is found in the 
affidavit of Gil Kerlikowske, the Commissioner of United States Customs and Border Protection 
(“CBP”), who articulates for the first time the DHS’ position as to how DAPA might aid the 
DHS in its mission to protect the border.  He states that if a DAPA recipient is encountered by 
ICE or CBP agents to whom he or she can present documentation showing that he or she is a 
low-priority individual for removal, then those agents can simply “take no other action with 
regard to that individual.”  [Doc. No. 150‒2 at 4].  Counsel for the Government reiterated this 
reasoning to the Court during the March 19, 2015 hearing. 
Importantly, however, as counsel for the Government admitted in open court, the 
Government does not need DAPA to effectuate this goal.  [See, e.g., Hr’g Tr. 29‒31, Mar. 19, 
2015].  The DHS could conduct the same investigation and provide such documentation 
designating certain illegal immigrants as low-priority law enforcement targets without 
additionally awarding legal status and the other benefits previously described in detail.  (In fact, 
the DHS has always had the ability to do this.  This Court’s injunction does not affect that 
ability.)  Counsel for the Government explained that there might be a better turnout for this 
effort, however, if the DHS provided incentives.  [Id. at 30].  While the wisdom and legality of 
incentivizing illegal immigrants to remain in the country illegally may or may not be debated at 
trial, what this revelation makes abundantly clear is that the Government has a workable and 
legal alternative.16  The States have no such alternative.  When balancing the potential harms to 
                                                            
16 Another reaffirmed conclusion drawn from the exchange between the Court and counsel for the Government at 
the most recent hearing is that the 2014 DHS Directive is a complete change of policy that requires, at the very least, 
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each side (as required under the preliminary injunction analysis), the scales of justice greatly 
favor the States. 
Further, it is obvious that there is no pressing, emergent need for this program.  If there 
had been such a need, the DHS could have implemented the program at any time in the last five 
or ten years, or even in the many decades preceding the 2014 DHS Directive.  The Government 
has not shown any credible reason for why this Directive necessitates immediate 
implementation. 
V. Plaintiffs Have Irreparable Injuries That Cannot Be Cured With Monetary 
Damages 
 
The last important issue addressed during the hearing on the Motion to Stay was the 
admission that money damages, if awarded, would in effect be the equivalent of having the Court 
order that the States (and their citizens) pay their own damages.  While this Court in its February 
Opinion (and the parties no doubt in their briefings) assumed for injunction purposes that an 
award of money damages would not and could not make the States whole (if injunctive relief did 
not issue), this assumption was confirmed at the hearing by counsel for the Government.  [Hr’g 
Tr. 26‒27, Mar. 19, 2015].  An award of money damages to the Plaintiffs would, at least in large 
part, be paid for by the Plaintiffs.  Therefore, it is irrefutable that, even if one assumes that the 
States’ future harm was solely monetary,17 an injunction would still be necessary to prevent 




compliance with the APA.  Instead of removing certain aliens as required by existing law, the DHS has changed the 
law to incentivize all qualifying parents of citizens and legal permanent residents who are illegally in the United 
States to remain in the United States.  The 2014 DHS Directive represents a new mandatory program, implemented 
in the face of the INA’s removal requirements, and must at least comply with the APA. 
17 This Court found that there were both monetary and non-monetary damages directly due to the 2014 DHS 
Directive. 




 Having considered the Emergency Motion to Stay [Doc. No. 150], the briefing filed by 
both sides, and the argument of counsel, the Court hereby denies the Government’s Motion to 
Stay its February 16, 2015 Order of Temporary Injunction. 
 





       ________________________________ 
       Andrew S. Hanen 
       United States District Judge 
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